CARRICK'S PERFECT START: FULL MATCH ANALYSIS
- Sourabh Banerjee
- 2 days ago
- 4 min read
After Ruben Amorim was sacked, Michael Carrick took charge of Manchester United as interim manager. His first real test came against Pep Guardiola and Manchester City at Old Trafford - and United passed it brilliantly.
United were coming off a 2–1 defeat to Brighton in the FA Cup, so confidence wasn’t high. But Carrick’s game plan was clear, simple, and very effective.
Line-Ups
Carrick started with a basic 4-2-3-1.
Goalkeeper: Lammens
Defenders: Dalot, Maguire, Martínez, Shaw
Double pivot: Mainoo and Casemiro
Attacking midfielder: Fernandes
Attack: Mbeumo as the striker, with Diallo and Dorgu on the wings
Manchester City maintained their usual 4-3-3 / 4-1-4-1 structure.
Goalkeeper: Donnarumma
Defenders: Lewis, Khusanov, Alleyne, Aké
Pivot: Rodri
Midfielders: Semenyo, Foden, Silva, Doku
Striker: Haaland
Carrick traps City’s young left centre-back
Out-of-possession organisation
Carrick used a 4-4-2 in a high-to-mid block. The front two were positioned diagonally.
One forward (Mbeumo or Fernandes) marked Rodri using a cover shadow
The other forward cut off the back pass to the goalkeeper
United applied pressure on City’s young left centre-back, forcing him to play towards Aké. Amad pressed Aké diagonally, blocking his stronger right foot and forcing him wide onto his weaker side. This created a 4v3 advantage for United.
The same 4-4-2 was used in midfield against City’s 3-1-3-1 structure.
City attempted to build in a 3-1-3-1 shape.
Mbeumo positioned himself between the two centre-backs to block passing lanes
Fernandes shadowed Rodri while pressing Alleyne
Aké was kept in Amad’s cover shadow, limiting passes into Silva
Players positioned between the lines were well marked
City overloads the left side
To create more passing options, Silva dropped wide into the first line before later moving between the centre-backs. This gave Alleyne more time on the ball.
With both centre-backs positioned wide, Aké began to act like a wing-back. This caused problems for Dalot, who had to decide whether to protect depth or width.
Doku’s double movements added complexity, as he occasionally joined the pivot to drag his marker and open the half-space. However:
No City player arrived to exploit the left half-space
Alleyne’s delayed decision-making allowed Casemiro to recover
Despite a 3v1 structural advantage, City failed to use it
Key principle: Creating space is not enough - it must be exploited early. Delayed decisions make structural advantages ineffective.
City switches and United counter
When City attempted to switch play, it often created counter-attacking opportunities for United due to:
Mbeumo’s close positioning and immediate forward runs
Rico Lewis positioning himself between the lines
This allowed Dorgu to keep Lewis in his cover shadow and press Khusanov from the blind side.
Khusanov’s body orientation made things worse. He could not see Dorgu pressing him, lost possession, and conceded a dangerous 4v4 situation. Donnarumma was forced to rush out and make the save.
Later in the match, Rico Lewis adjusted his positioning by:
Dropping into the double pivot
Moving wider to help switch play
United’s deep defensive block
In the final third of their own half, United often defended in a passive 6-2-2, allowing City’s first line to circulate the ball freely.
Deeper still, United defended in a 6v10, doubling up on City’s wingers - especially Doku.
Amad showed excellent awareness of when to press and when to drop into the last line. This allowed Dalot to press aggressively without leaving space behind him.
The double pivot shifted across to block central passing lanes
Channel spaces between centre-backs and full-backs were closed
Haaland was consistently defended in a 2v1
In wide areas, United faced a 5v7, but Dorgu dropped to create a clear 2v1 and blocked diagonal passes to Rico Lewis.
United in possession
United stayed compact defensively and only stepped out aggressively when City tried to play between the lines.
In build-up, United used a 1-4-2-4 against City’s 4-4-2 high press.
Rico Lewis stepped out to man-mark Shaw
Rodri dropped into the back line to track Fernandes
Fernandes started high to receive between the lines
Blind-side runs were a key attacking principle. Dalot repeatedly ran beyond Doku, who stayed narrow and high, creating frequent 2v1s against Aké. Fernandes also drifted wide at times to overload that side.
Alternative build-up structure
Without using the goalkeeper, United adjusted against City’s 4-1-4-1, which shifted into a 4-4-2 as Foden pressed alongside Haaland.
United set up in a flat 4-2-4, with Shaw starting deeper to create an asymmetric back four.
Semenyo stayed narrow
Rico Lewis was pinned by Dorgu
Shaw played into pockets for Fernandes or over the full-back
Mainoo dragged his marker to open passing lanes
United also used third-man combinations to bypass City’s press when Lewis stepped out and Semenyo focused on Mainoo.
As the match progressed:
Shaw pushed wider and higher
United created double width on both sides
Fernandes operated freely between the lines and in wide pockets
Fernandes’ role under Carrick
Under Amorim, Fernandes often played deeper as a pivot. Carrick used him much higher, giving him freedom to find space and create overloads.
Takeaway
Pep Guardiola’s approach in the final third was predictable, and City struggled to break down United’s deep block. Even during high-pressure phases, City failed to progress the ball effectively. Bernardo Silva dropping deeper disrupted City’s attacking structure.
Carrick, meanwhile, started strongly with clear principles, especially defensively. United’s attacking play resembled structured counter-attacking, drawing City to one side before quickly exploiting space on the opposite side.
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