Is Cesc Fabregas The Next Pep Guardiola?
- Sourabh Banerjee
- 9 minutes ago
- 7 min read
Pep Guardiola is widely regarded as the most influential manager of this decade. Many teams across Europe, even lower division clubs in England, attempt to replicate his playing model, especially his structured positional play approach.
Positional play, often called juego de posición, is built on clear tactical principles:
● Pre occupied zones: Each player occupies specific spaces on the pitch to create structure and balance.
● Optimal spacing: Players maintain correct distances between each other to stretch the opponent both vertically, depth, and horizontally, width.
● Maximizing the field: The team uses the full width and depth of the pitch to open passing lanes.
● Finding the free man: Through constant circulation of the ball, the objective is to move the opponent and create superiority, numerical or positional, to free a teammate between the lines.
Under Guardiola at clubs like FC Barcelona, Bayern Munich, and Manchester City, these principles evolved into a highly refined system. His teams dominate possession not for its own sake, but to control space, manipulate defensive structures, and create high quality chances.
In the new era, new coaches have emerged who are influenced by Pep Guardiola, such as Arne Slot, Cesc Fabregas, Enzo Maresca, and Xabi Alonso. In terms of long term dominance, we cannot yet say that any of them will be the next Pep.
We can clearly find similarities in their playing styles. Cesc Fabregas has been doing great with Como 1907 since last season. His team ranks first in possession in Serie A, with an average of 62 percent, and averages 5.77 passes per possession.
In defence, Como 1907 is highly aggressive and loves to win the ball higher up the pitch, reflected in their low PPDA. However, they are less focused on counterattacks. This suggests that Cesc Fabregas wants to control the transition phase rather than rely on direct counterattacking football.
Como’s in possession principles
In possession, Cesc Fabregas’ Como 1907 tries to build up with eight outfield players plus the goalkeeper, forming a 1 2 4 2 2 shape. The two centre backs stay in the first line, with the two full backs and two pivots forming the next line. There are no players constantly attacking in depth. Instead, the two strikers drop into the half spaces, while the two wide wingers provide width to maximize the team’s horizontal stretch.
They often operate with two false nines, a concept that became hugely popular in Pep Guardiola’s teams, with players like Lionel Messi and Kevin De Bruyne frequently performing similar roles.
The team likes to play lots of one two and third man combinations in build up.
Game against Lazio. 2 v 4 in the last line, no depth in the last line, but 9 v 6 with goalkeeper advantage in the rest of the field.
Cesc Fabregas has spoken about how his team adapts to different types of pressure from opponents. When opponents adopt a more zonal approach, focusing on protecting the centre rather than aggressively pressing with direct access, Como looks to create numerical superiority. In these situations, the roles of the full backs and pivots change according to the opponent’s first line of pressure. They constantly provide options and open passing lanes to progress the ball through rotations.
For example, against AC Milan, who played in a 4 4 2 shape, Como adjusted their structure to bypass the first line of pressure. One midfielder dropped into the first line to create a back three during build up, while another positioned himself between Milan’s strikers and midfield line to offer a central progression option.
Another solution came when AC Milan pressed outside and used a man oriented approach. In those situations, players like Nico Paz or Maxence Caqueret dropped wide to protect the ball and combine through quick give and go actions.
Against heavy man oriented pressing, especially from teams that pressed from inside to outside, this became a key solution. By moving wide and creating short combinations, Cesc Fabregas’ Como 1907 could escape pressure and progress the ball into advanced areas.
Teams like Napoli, who were extremely man oriented and very difficult to play through, forced Como to find different solutions to progress the ball.
In those matches, goalkeeper Maxime Butez became crucial. He was exceptional on the ball, similar to how Pep Guardiola used Ederson, a goalkeeper capable of attacking depth with long, precise passes. Against full man oriented systems, Butez often bypassed the press directly with long balls into advanced areas.
The centre backs also positioned themselves wider to give the goalkeeper better visibility and passing angles. This made it more difficult for the opponent’s strikers to press in a curved run and use their cover shadow to block access to the centre backs.
Because pure man marking systems often leave no spare defender to secure depth, Como’s full backs and wingers attacked the space behind continuously. The two false nines dropped closer to the pivot to create short passing options and attract markers. At times, the pivot, such as Máximo Perrone or Sergi Roberto, separated from their direct markers with intelligent movements to create space and open central progression lanes.
In the creation phase, Cesc Fabregas combines both positional and relational ideas. One common pattern is overloading the right side of the pitch to attract the opponent’s block, then quickly switching the ball to the weak side to attack depth.
In these situations, the left back, such as Álex Valle, makes aggressive runs beyond the last defensive line, attacking the space behind the opponent’s back four. Valle often creates an overload against the defensive line with his timing and positioning.
During this phase, he rotates with one of the two pivots, mostly Sergi Roberto or another central midfielder, depending on the structure. He not only attacks the wide channel but also makes central depth runs, giving Como 1907 multiple vertical options in the final third.
When Como uses a more relational structure, it differs from the classic positional ideas of Pep Guardiola. This approach is closer to the concepts popularized in recent years by Brazilian coach Fernando Diniz.
In this relational model, players move closer together, forming short distance connections and combinations. It is more about ball orientation than positional orientation. Corte de luz, a Spanish term meaning cut of light, is a deceptive movement used to manipulate the defender and open a passing lane.
There is often a right side tilt, where multiple players overload that flank to create superiority through proximity rather than strict positional spacing. Defensively, they apply the idea of a defensive diagonal, shifting the block diagonally to close the half spaces and mark the opposite side winger more effectively.
This blend of positional discipline and relational fluidity shows how Cesc Fabregas is adapting modern tactical ideas beyond a pure Guardiola framework.
Como’s tilting on the right side, overload 6 v 4 around the ball, defensive diagonal to protect the counterattack.
Como out of possession
Como’s out of possession structure is relatively simple. It is a blend between a compact narrow 4 4 2 and a 4 2 4, and most of the time they operate in a high to mid block. Wide wingers are narrow and protect the half space with the front foot when triggers occur.
One of their main pressing triggers starts with a centre forward curving his run between the centre backs, forcing the opponent to play toward the wide areas. Once the ball is played outside, Como becomes highly man oriented on that side. Using the touchline as an extra defender, they compress space aggressively, making it very difficult for the opponent to escape.
At the same time, the far side winger tucks in to close central passing lanes and protect switches, maintaining compactness and preventing easy circulation to the weak side.
A sweeper goalkeeper like Maxime Butez helps Como maintain a high defensive line.
When the press fails, especially if the opponent commits many players forward and looks to play long balls over the block, Butez reacts quickly by coming off his line to clear the danger. In these situations, he operates similarly to Manuel Neuer, acting almost as an extra defender behind the back line.
Transition phase of Como
Como 1907 uses a 3 2 or 2 3 structure as a rest defence when they adopt a more positional play approach. This structure secures central spaces and protects against counterattacks while maintaining good coverage behind the ball.
In these moments, they apply strong counterpressing, also known as gegenpressing, aiming to regain possession immediately after losing it and as high up the pitch as possible. However, their attacking transition is relatively patient. They do not always counterattack at full speed, but instead look to re establish control and organize the next phase.
When operating in a more relational structure, they use tilting, overloading one side of the pitch, along with the concept of a defensive diagonal to protect the far side half space and manage switches of play. This balance between positional rest defence and relational defensive movements reflects the tactical flexibility introduced by Cesc Fabregas.
Conclusion
It would be an interesting situation if Cesc Fabregas were hired by Manchester City to replace Pep Guardiola.
With the current squad, players like Rayan Cherki and Phil Foden could thrive even more in a relational, combination based structure. Both are excellent in tight spaces, strong in short combinations, and intelligent in third man movements, qualities that suit relational play with diagonal connections and fluid rotations.
The bigger tactical question would be how to maximize Erling Haaland within Fabregas’ build up structure. Unlike a false nine profile, Haaland is a pure depth attacker. Fabregas would need to balance relational combinations around the ball with vertical occupation of the last line.
